This paper proposes a model of entrepreneurial innovation that explains its pronounced pattern of boom and bust. In the model, a successful entrepreneurial project is the result of a search and matching process between entrepreneurs looking for funds and capitalists looking for new ideas to finance. The resulting strategic complementarity between them gives rise to a multiplier effect, whereby any exogenous shock has a magnified effect on the process of innovation. Handcollecting data on the venture capital market of 21 developed countries for the period 2004-2012, we show that, at the country level, a complementarity exists between the size of the venture capital sector and the number of innovative entrepreneurs. This evidence suggests the existence of a thick market externality in the financial market for innovation.
Introduction
Suppose you think you have a promising idea for a new business venture. However, you find it hard to finance your project from banks or other conventional sources of capital, because of its high degree of uncertainty and/or lack of good collateral. You might then want to turn to other agents, specialized in screening and evaluating innovative business projects exactly like yours. If they judge your project valuable, these agents decide to provide you with the necessary capital, as well as technical and managerial advice, in exchange for an equity stake in the project. In the standard economics terminology, you are referred to as the entrepreneur, and the specialized agents as the capitalists (such as venture capitalists or business angels). The whole process is usually described as one of entrepreneurial innovation.
A distinctive feature of entrepreneurial investments is their higher volatility over time. In Figure 1 , we have depicted the volatility of "more traditional" investments, those in fixed capital and in R&D, for the period 1995-2013 in both the US and Europe. 1, 2 INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The pronounced volatility in Figure 1 almost disappears when we compare it with the one observed on the investments provided by venture capitalists (VCs) and private equity (PE) funds devoted to seed and start-ups, as shown in Figure 2 for both the US and Europe in the same period. A look at Figure 2 clearly suggests a pattern of boom and bust of entrepreneurial investments. In particular, both the dotcom bubble (and In this paper, we propose a simple model of entrepreneurial innovation that may contribute to explain this volatility over time, and then we try to validate empirically its main theoretical claims against the available data on entrepreneurial innovation.
We use a dynamic, partial-equilibrium model where an entrepreneurial project (or an innovative, start-up firm) is the outcome of a process of search and matching between the two main actors of the innovative process: those who come up with new ideas, that we call entrepreneurs (or simply innovators); and those who screen and select the most valuable ideas deserving financing funds, that we call capitalists (or simply financiers). An innovation is the result of a successful matching between an entrepreneur and a capitalist. 4 In our model, entrepreneurs are willing to spend their time and intellectual resources to discover a new idea only if they have a chance to meet a capitalist. On the other hand, capitalists are willing to spend their time and intellectual resources to evaluate the profitability of ideas only if they have the chance to meet valuable entrepreneurs.
More generally, the return to becoming an entrepreneur (capitalist) is higher, the higher the number of capitalists (entrepreneurs) in the market. Hence, and as usual in the class of search and matching models (Diamond, 1982, Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993) , a thick market externality characterizes the financial market of innovation.
The strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists -that is, the fact that the number of entrepreneurs devoting to innovation is an increasing function in the number of capitalists, and viceversa-implies the existence of a multiplier effect in entrepreneurial innovation, whereby the effect of an exogenous shock on the pace of innovation is magnified by the self-reinforcing nature of the interaction between the two sides of the market for ideas.
In the second part of the paper, we test empirically the main theoretical claim of the model, that is, the mutual positive interaction between entrepreneurs and capitalists, for 21 developed countries (20 European countries plus the US) over the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . We gather data on the number of early-stage innovative entrepreneurs from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), and we hand-collect data on the total amount of venture capital funds available for investment from the European Venture Capital Association and from the National Venture Capital Association (for the US).
We use 4 approaches to estimate the complementarity: fixed effects estimation (FE), two-stage least squares (2SLS), three-stage least squares (3SLS), and Arellano-Bover estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995) . The whole set of results confirm the existence of a statistically and economically significant complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists. In particular, we find that a one percentage point increase in the volume of venture capital managed funds (as percentage of GDP) increases the number of innovative entrepreneurs (as a percentage of adult population) by between 1.2 and 1.7 percentage points. Conversely, a one percentage point increase in the number of innovative entrepreneurs (as a percentage of adult population) increases the volume of venture capital managed funds (as percentage of GDP) by between 0.03 and 0.04. Based on these estimates, we finally carry out a simple quantitative exercise and obtain a value of the multiplier between 1.03 (from the Arellano-Bover estimation) and 1.08 (from the pure FE model). This number tells us that a shock to either side of the market produces a final effect on the market equilibrium values of entrepreneurs and capitalists which is between 3% and 8% higher than it would have produced in the absence of strategic complementarity. Although clearly not exhaustive, this multiplier effect may contribute to explain the pronounced volatility of entrepreneurial investments that we have documented in Figure 2 .
The goal of this paper is that of modeling and documenting empirically the market frictions characterizing the financial market of innovation. In the words of Phelps (2009, p. 50) , "the classical supply-and-demand apparatus does not apply to the core market of capitalist economies -the capital market, particularly the market for capital going to entrepreneurs' innovative projects". In this paper, we provide some evidence in favor of this statement. In other words, while in a standard frictionless market, demand and supply are independently determined, in this paper we claim theoretically, and verify empirically, the existence of a mutual positive interaction (a "strategic complementarity") between demand and supply in the financial market of innovation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework. Section 4 characterizes the stationary equilibrium, proves the strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists and derives the multiplier effect. Section 5 carries out the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper. Proofs are relegated to a technical appendix at the end of the manuscript.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature, initiated by Arrow (1962) , on the market failures associated with the process of innovation, and more particularly, with the process of innovation financing. Both microeconomic theory and empirical evidence have long recognized the existence of binding financial constraints in the innovation process (for a review of the literature see, for instance, Hall and Lerner, 2010) . Theoretical arguments, proposed to explain financial market imperfections in this sector, range from transaction costs to agency problems due to informational asymmetries between the innovator (agent) and the financier (principal). 5 We capture financial market imperfections via search theory. This modeling strategy is inspired by the following observations. Entrepreneurs and capitalists are heterogeneous in terms of skills, location, beliefs, information etc. It then takes time and resources for an entrepreneur to find and convince a financier about the profitability of her business venture; and it takes time and resources for a financier to select the innovative project that she believes is worth financing. As a result, entrepreneurial finance can be depicted as a decentralized market where heterogeneous entrepreneurs and financiers meet bilaterally according to a matching technology. In the words of Phelps (2009, p. 52), "the capital market is a sort of matching process that matches a financier to an entrepreneur who the former sees as having a model compatible with his own model". Search theory is then a convenient modeling tool to capture succintly the frictions characterizing the financial market for innovation.
The idea of modeling entrepreneurial innovation as a process of search and matching is not new in the entrepreneurial finance literature. 6 A few papers explore the micro- 5 While these aspects are common to any financing relationship, a number of additional elements suggest that financing problems can be even more severe for innovative investments: innovations are unique events, and the process aimed at producing them is an uncertain and largely unpredictable economic activity. 6 Prior to finance, search theory has been extensively applied to several fields in economics, such as labor economics, monetary theory, and the theory of marriage.
light on the stylized fact highlighted above. Three other contributions deserve special mention inside this stream of literature. The first is the work by Inderst and Muller (2004) , who construct a search and matching model of entrepreneurial innovation that may generate a pattern of boom and bust of entrepreneurial investments. Their theory, however, does not rely on the strategic complementarity across the two sides of the market of innovation: 7 ups and downs are instead due to a self-reinforcing relationship between the profitability of entrepreneurial investments, the entry of venture capitalists and the market valuation of start-ups. The second contribution is the one by Michelacci and Suarez (2004) , who analyze the relationship between entrepreneurial finance and the stock market development in the framework of an endogenous growth model. Interestingly, the model may generate multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria as a result of a complementarity across the "going public" decisions of start-up firms.
The third is Giordani (2015) , who analyzes the welfare consequences of search frictions in the financing of innovation in a general equilibrium context of an endogenous R&D-driven growth model.
The Model
The world is populated by a measure E of entrepreneurs and a measure K of capitalists who must decide whether to participate or not in a fair of ideas. 8 Time is continuous, and new ideas arrive randomly to the entrepreneurs according to a Poisson process with (exogenous) instantaneous probability σ. In order for these raw entrepreneurial ideas to become marketable innovations however, entrepreneurs need the (financial and managerial) support of capitalists.
Once an entrepreneur has come up with a new idea, she has to decide whether to pursue it by participating in the fair, or abandon it and wait for the next idea. To pursue it, each entrepreneur has to pay a cost c E , representing the cost of developing and submitting the project to the financiers. This cost is idiosyncratically drawn from a (twice continuously differentiable) cumulative distribution function
. If the entrepreneur pays her own c E , she acquires the right to participate in the fair and hence, as we will see, the chance of matching the "right"
7 Indeed in their model, due to the hypothesis of a constant flow of new ideas over each unit of time, entrepreneurs and capitalists are inversely related. 8 The theoretical framework that we present here resembles Diamond's (1982) To analyze the entry decisions of entrepreneurs and capitalists in the fair of ideas, we now need to specify the potential benefits that accrue to them if they pay the entry fee. Let L E ≤ E and L K ≤ K denote, respectively, the endogenous stock of entrepreneurs and capitalists participating in the fair at each instant of time, that is, those that have paid their respective entry cost. 10 An entrepreneurial venture is the result of a process of successful search and matching between an entrepreneur and a capitalist both attending the fair. We capture this production process of new ideas via the following aggregate matching function:
with ∂M/∂L j > 0 and ∂ 2 M/∂L 2 j < 0 for j = E, K, implying positive and decreasing marginal returns to both inputs. We also impose M (L E , 0) = M (0, L K ) = 0 (that is, the absence of entrepreneurs or capitalists implies zero successful matches) and homogeneity of degree 1 of the matching function (which ensures equilibrium uniqueness 11 ).
The instantaneous probability of matching for, respectively, entrepreneurs and capitalists attending the fair, is then given by
The standard assumptions on the first two derivatives of the matching function imply that ∂α j /∂L j < 0 and ∂α j /∂L −j > 0 for j = E, K. That is to say, the match- 9 One might alternatively interpret c E and c K as outside options, that is, as the opportunity costs of devoting to entrepreneurial innovation. The opportunity cost of capitalists is constant over time, that of entrepreneurs varies with the idea. 10 Given that our focus will be on the stationary equilibrium of this economy, we drop time subscripts to ease notation. 11 In a related paper, Cipollone and Giordani (2015) confirm the empirical plausibility of equilibrium uniqueness by explicitly estimating the scale elasticity of the matching function using data from the business angel market.
ing probability for an entrepreneur decreases with the number of entrepreneurs and increases with the number of capitalists (and the same holds for capitalists). Without loss of generality, entrepreneurs and capitalists are assumed risk neutral and to discount the future via the exogenous riskless interest rate r. At any point in time, entrepreneurs and capitalists can be in two states: either outside or inside the fair of ideas. In order to determine the expected benefits from entry, we need to define the values of both states for both agents. Let us start with entrepreneurs.
For an entrepreneur, the value of being outside the fair (and thus of waiting for a new idea) is denoted by V 0 E and defined by the following asset equation:
where c * E is the highest cost for which there is still entry (to be determined at equilibrium), and V 1 E represents the value of being inside the fair (that is, the expected payoff associated with the entrepreneurial venture for an entrepreneur attending the fair). This latter value is defined by
where π represents total instantaneous profits originating from the innovation, and θ ∈ (0, 1) is the entrepreneurs' fraction of these profits. These asset equations have the usual interpretations. Equation (3) tells us that, for an entrepreneur, the flow of utility from waiting for a new idea is equal to the instantanous probability of a new idea times the corresponding payoff, which is given by the capital gain associated with participating in the fair minus the entry cost. Equation (4) says that the flow of utility from venturing into innovation is equal to the probability of a successful matching with a capitalist times the payoff associated with this chance, plus the capital gain (or loss)
deriving from exiting from the fair. Note that, in the two expressions above, we have decided to focus directly on the steady state, as we have imposedV h E = 0 for h = 0, 1. Two implicit assumptions in (4) are worth noticing. First, every match becomes a successful innovation, that is to say, every venture-backed firm raises positive profits. Indeed, observation suggests that only a small fraction of funded projects reaches that stage (anecdotal evidence suggests that this fraction is below 20%). The second assumption is that, whether or not a successful matching has occurred, all entrepreneurs go back to the initial "inventive" stage (say, by selling their idea -or patent-to a firm which will start production in case of successful matching, or coming up with a new, better idea in case of failure). 12 This endless circular process is meant to represent the so called venture capital cycle described by Gompers and Lerner (1999) . None of these assumptions is necessary for any of our results. Let us now turn to capitalists. The expected payoff associated with being a capitalist outside the fair is denoted by V 0 K and defined by the following asset equation:
for all c K ≥ c * K , and where V 1 K represents the expected value from participating in the fair of ideas. This value is defined by
where (1 − θ) π is the capitalists' fraction of the profits prevailing in the market (again, along the steady state it isV h K = 0 for h = 0, 1). Here again, two issues are worth remarking. First, the allocation of the innovation profits across entrepreneurs and capitalists, as captured by the parameter θ, is here taken as exogenous. This is not because we believe the contractual arrangement between entrepreneurs and capitalists is uninteresting but simply because our focus is different.
14 Secondly, in expression (6) we have implicitly supposed that the cost of financing the entrepreneurial project is null (so that the capitalists' contribution to the venture is technical and/or managerial but not financial). This is only to economize on parameters and simplify calculations.
We are now ready to characterize the expected benefit of participating into the fair of ideas for both entrepreneurs and capitalists. By entering into the fair, an entrepreneur loses V 0 E and gains V 1 E . As a result, her net expected benefit is measured by the difference (4), and solving the resulting equation for 12 In the business literature, an individual with such characteristics is sometimes referred to as a serial entrepreneur. We prefer to portray him/her as a Schumpeterian entrepreneur, given that he/she dedicates exclusively to innovation. 13 The implicit assumption here is that each capitalist can enter into one and only one project at a time, and that each entrepreneur needs one and only one capitalist. 14 An extensive literature has focused on optimal contracts between capitalists and entrepreneurs 
It is immediate to prove that the expression above is increasing in α E , and thus in L K . 15 The intuition is straightforward: the higher the number of capitalists, the higher the matching probability for an entrepreneur, and hence the higher her return from participating in the innovation process.
The same argument holds for capitalists. Their expected benefit from fair attendance is measured by the difference
Again, solving the system made up of (5) and (6) for
which is increasing in α K , and thus in L E .
In the next section we characterize the optimal entry decisions for both entrepreneurs and capitalists as well as the stationary equilibrium resulting from their optimal choice behavior.
Complementarities in the Financial Market of Innovation
At each point in time, the choice of the E − L E entrepreneurs who are outside the fair, as to whether to pursue their project or abandon it, depends on the relative costs and benefits of the project. The cost c E is distributed according to F (c E ), while the benefit is measured by the difference
There exists an inframarginal entrepreneur for 15 Differentiating (7) with respect to L K , we obtain
which is always strictly positive, given that the marginal productivity of capitalists is strictly positive (∂M/∂L K > 0).
Substituting for the expression given in (7), we obtain
All entrepreneurs whose entry cost is lower than c * E find it profitable to participate in the fair. The expression above links the threshold cost c * E to the probability of successful matching for entrepreneurs α E , and hence to the number of entrepreneurs and capitalists attending the fair, L E , L K : it is easy to prove that a higher L K and/or a lower L E lead to an increase in the probability of a successful matching with a capitalist (α E ), which in turn causes an increase in the cutoff value of the entry cost c * E . 16 In analogy to the previous case, the chance of a successful matching with an entrepreneur is worth
Given that the cost of this chance c K is distributed according to G (c K ), there exists an inframarginal capitalist for whom
Substituting for the expression given in (8), we obtain
All capitalists whose entry cost is lower than c * K find it profitable to participate in the fair. This expression captures the positive relationship between α K and c * K . Finally remind that, for both entrepreneurs and capitalists, the inflows into the fair of innovation must be equal to the outflows along the steady state, that iṡ
Equation (11) captures the evolution of entrepreneurs over time. Along the steady state, the number of entrepreneurs deciding to participate in the fair (σ (E − L E ) F (c * E )) must equalize the number of entrepreneurs who exit from the fair (whether successfully 16 Define
as the implicit function of c * E with respect to α E . It is immediate to prove, via the implicit function theorem, that dc *
or not) and return to the waiting stage (L E ). An analogous interpretation can be given to (12) .
Equation (11) can be interpreted as a positive relationship between L E and c * E .
17
A higher value of c * E implies greater entry in the market of innovation. To maintain the steady state, the number of exits must correspondingly increase. Hence, a higher value of L E is required for equation (11) to hold. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for equation (12) capturing L K as a positive function of c * K . Before defining a stationary equilibrium for this economy, let us characterize the type of interdependence between entrepreneurs and capitalists that is implied by this model. The number of entrepreneurs venturing in innovative projects depends on the number of capitalists deciding to back these projects, as this affects the chance of a successful matching. This relationship is captured by a best-response function for
, that is implicitly defined by the system made up of (9) and (11) . On the other hand, the number of capitalists devoting their time and resources to screening and evaluating innovative projects depends on the chances of encountering good potential entrepreneurs. This relationship is given by the capitalists' best-response function,
, defined by the system made up of (10) and (12) . We now prove that these two best-response functions are positively sloped.
Theorem 1 Entrepreneurs and capitalists are strategic complements, in that the number of entrepreneurs attending the fair of ideas is an increasing function of the number of capitalists attending the fair, and viceversa: df j /dL −j > 0 ∀j = E, K.
Intuitively, a higher number of capitalists participating in the fair raises the chance of a successful matching for an entrepreneur, it makes her participation to the fair more profitable, and thus it brings about an increase in the number of entrepreneurs (and viceversa). This complementarity is strategic, as it is the result of endogenous and interdependent entry choices of the two types of agents. Its existence will be verified empirically in the next section. We are ready for the following Definition. A stationary equilibrium for this economy is any 4-tuple (L E , L K , c * E , c * K ) that solves the four equations (9), (10), (11) and (12).
As recalled above, the hypothesis of homogeneity of degree 1 of the matching function ensures that, if an equilibrium exists, it is unique (see footnote 11). The presence of strategic complementarities between the two sides of the market, however, makes this equilibrium highly sensitive to disturbances. For illustrative purposes, say that a negative macroeconomic shock hits this economy so that, for instance, ∆π < 0 (say, a negative business cycle hurting corporate profts). This negative shock directly reduces the payoff to both entrepreneurial and capitalistic activities. This, however, is not the end of the story. The lower number of entrepreneurs weakens the incentive to become capitalist, which in turn further lowers the incentive to entrepreneurship (and viceversa). This process continues ad infinitum, describing a vicious circle whereby the aggregate response to the shock is stronger than the initial partial response. In other words, the strategic complementarity across the two main actors of the innovation process magnifies the initial effect of the shock and gives rise to what is usually referred to as a multiplier effect.
More formally, define L j = f j (L −j , ρ) as the (positively sloped) reaction function of agents of type j with respect to the agents of type −j (for j = E, K), parameterized by ρ capturing any feature that affects L j other than changes in L −j . We are now ready to state the following Theorem 2 A multiplier effect characterizes the process of entrepreneurial finance, in that the total equilibrium response of entrepreneurs and capitalists to an exogenous shock is greater than the partial response:
As a result of this multiplier effect, any factor that affects the entrepreneurs' or the capitalists' payoff may have a big impact on the level of innovative activity. This mutual, self-reinforcing, interaction between entrepreneurs and capitalists contributes to explain the high volatility of entrepreneurial investments that we have documented in Figure 2 . To use a phrase from Summers (1988), our entrepreneurial equilibrium is fragile, in the sense that it is potentially subject to large fluctuations in the level of activity. In the next section we give an empirical estimate of the multiplier effect for the venture capital market.
Empirical Evidence from the Venture Capital Market
This section is devoted to the empirical validation of the model's findings. We introduce the dataset (subsection 5.1), describe the empirical strategy (subsection 5.2), present the findings (subsection 5.3), and carry out a simple quantitative exercise on the multiplier effect (subsection 5.4). The number of potential innovative entrepreneurs. The number of potential entrepreneurs poses a serious measurement challenge as we usually observe the number of actual entrepreneurs, which is a proper subset of the group of those who are willing to become entrepreneurs but may or may have not been financed yet. To construct our proxy for this variable, we gather information from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), which is an annual survey of the entrepreneurial aspirations, attitudes and activities of individuals across a wide range of countries. We classify an individual as early stage innovative entrepreneur when this individual meets simultaneously the two following conditions: (i) being a nascent entrepreneur or owner-manager of a new business, (ii) indicating that their product or service is new to at least some customers.
Data
We now provide some details aboout these two requirements.
From the GEM data base, we extract the early-stage entrepreneurial activity indica- and starts increasing from 2011 (especially in such countries as the US, the UK, Spain, Romania, the Netherlands).
The size of the potential financing market. Our goal is to measure the size of the potential financing market through the total amount of financial funds managed by 18 To be qualified as nascent entrepreneur, one must be actively involved in setting up a business they will own or co-own (this business has not paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to the owners for more than three months); instead, those who are currently owning and managing a running business that has paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to the owners for more than three months (but not more than 42 months) are qualified as owner-managers of a new business. venture capital firms, defined as the total amount of funds available to fund managers for future start-up investments, plus the amount of funds already invested (at cost)
and not yet divested.
Unfortunately, this figure is readily available only for the US for our period of interest (from the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA)). For the remaining countries instead, the amount of funds managed by venture capital firms is only available for 2013 (from the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA)). To derive the same figure for the remaining years 2004-2012, we then proceed in two steps. In the first step, we hand-collect yearly flow data on the fundraising, investing and disinvesting activities of both European private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) firms for the period 2004-2013. These data allow us to find recursively the stock values for all years back to 2004 using the following difference equation (Appendix B contains a few more details of the iterative process that we apply): T otal managed f unds t = T otal managed f unds t−1 + T otal raised f unds t − T otal divestments t , with T otal managed f unds t , T otal raised funds t , and T otal divestments t respectively denoting the amount of funds managed, raised and divested by PE and VC firms at time t. Given that flow data are only available at the aggregate level (that is, as the sum of private equity and venture capital components), this backwards iterative exercise, however, only allows us to infer the aggregate stock of funds managed by both PE and VC firms for each year (T otal managed f unds t ).
In the second step then, we try to disentangle the sole component ascribed to VC firms (V C managed f unds t ) by exploiting the two following pieces of information. On the one hand, we know with certainty the share of funds managed by VC firms over the total amount of managed funds in 2013 (V C f unds ratio 2013 ). On the other hand, aggregate evidence on the European continent and the US (available from the yearly PREQUIN reports on "Global Private Equity & Venture Capital") for the period 2005-2013 suggests that this share -which is a stock value, not to be confounded with the flow value of the annual investments-does not vary significantly over the years. We then assume that this share does not vary over the period 2004-2013 and use the following formula to gain an estimate of VC managed funds for all previous years: (V C managed f unds t ) = (V Cfundsratio 2013 ) × (T otal managed funds t ) (again, Appendix B works out the details of this procedure).
A summary description of the constructed variable V C managed funds (as a percentage of GDP) across our sample of countries over the period 2004-2012 is provided in Table 2. INSERT TABLE 2 by banks or, more generally, by the financial sector (both as a percentage of GDP, from The World Bank) and their ratio, the degree of capital market capitalization (as a percentage of GDP, from The World Bank), the GDP growth (from Eurostat), the interest rate (from Eurostat), a trend variable and country dummies; (v) two measures of information transparency in the credit market: namely, the two World Bank indicators of "credit bureau coverage" and "credit registry coverage", which report the number of individuals and firms listed in their respective database (by a private credit bureau or in a public credit registry, respectively) with information on their borrowing history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding during the previous 5 years (both numbers are expressed as a percentage of the adult population). 21 Further details on the control variables can be found in the summary statistics provided in Tables A1 and A2 . 20 Articles are classified by year of publication and assigned to country on the basis of the institutional address(es) appearing on them. 21 A credit bureau is a private firm or nonprofit organization that maintains a database on the
The Estimation Strategy
As a first step, we estimate the following pair of equations using a fixed effects method:
where (l E ) it and (l K ) it are our proxies for the number of potential innovative entrepreneurs (as a % of 18-64 population) and the size of the potential financing market (as a % of GDP) in country i at time t; x E it and x K it are two vectors of controls including country and year dummies; ε i,t and η i,t are disturbance terms. In particular, vector x The two key parameters of our analysis are α K and β E . α K measures the impact of the share of potential innovative entrepreneurs on the venture capital market size; conversely, β E measures the impact of the venture capital market size on the share of potential innovative entrepreneurs. We expect both significantly positive (Theorem 1).
Equations (13), (14) are correctly and consistently estimated via pure fixed effects only if the explanatory variables are distributed independently of the disturbance term. If not, these estimators are likely to be biased. In this respect, our theoretical framework helps us identify the main source of endogeneity, which is the fact that creditworthiness of borrowers (individuals or firms) in the financial system and facilitates the exchange of credit information among creditors. A credit registry is a database managed by the public sector, usually by the central bank or the superintendent of banks, that primarily assists banking supervision and facilitates the exchange of information among creditors. the explanatory variables are partially determined as a function of each other (reverse causality). Given that the number of potential innovative entrepreneurs is a function of the venture capital market size and viceversa, l K and ε are correlated in equation (13) and l E and η are correlated in equation (14), making l K and l E endogenous. To address these issues, we employ three related instrumental variables (IV) techniques to correct for potential endogeneity bias.
Our first IV procedure is the two-stage least squares (2SLS) with fixed effects in two versions which employ the same set of instruments for the endogenous variables but differ with respect to the sets of exogenous regressors. In particular, in both models, as instruments for the financing market size, we employ the lagged size of the potential financing market ((l K ) i,t−1 , as a % of GDP) and the two measures of credit information transparency. The rationale behind the choice of these last two variables as instruments is that, as measures of information transparency in the financial market, they are likely to be positively correlated with the size of the potential financing market and uncorrelated with ε. Indeed, a credit bureau or a public registry are databases which collect information on the creditworthiness of borrowers (individuals or firms)
in the financial system in order to facilitate the exchange of credit information among creditors. Hence, they are likely to affect entrepreneurship via the supply of funds, that is, by influencing the financiers' willingness to lend. As instruments for the number of potential innovative entrepreneurs, we employ the lagged number of potential innovative entrepreneurs ((l E ) i,t−1 , as a % of 18-64 population), the number of scientific and technical published articles (as a percentage of the number of scientific graduates) and the number of scientific graduates as a percentage of graduates in all fields, and finally the current and the lagged amounts of incentives to startups (as a % of GDP).
We include the second and the third variable among the set of instruments for (l E ) i,t because they are thought to affect directly the demand side of the financial market of innovation only, the reason being that innovative entrepreneurial ideas are disproportionately concentrated in such sectors as ICT, biotechnology, energy and environmental technology. As a result, the higher the number of scientific articles and graduates, the higher the demand of venture capital funds. Finally, the rationale behind the choice of the amount of incentives to startups (as a % of GDP) is that, as direct subsidies to innovative entrepreneurship, startup incentives are likely to affect the size of the venture capital market only through their positive effect on innovative entrepreneurs (i.e. only once supported start-ups are seeking broad funds and expansion capital). We add the amount of incentives to startups also in its lagged form since we cannot exclude that our aspiring entrepreneurs gained access to business grants in the previous year.
As anticipated, the two versions of the 2SLS model with FE differ with respect to the choice of the second stage exogenous regressors. In the first version, the second stage equation replicates the pure FE model (equations (13), (14)). The second version, instead, adds lagged variables among the set of second stage exogenous regressors, by employing also the lagged size of the potential financing market ((l K ) i,t−1 , as a % of GDP) in the estimation model for the size of venture capital funds, and the lagged number of potential innovative entrepreneurs ((l E ) i,t−1 , as a % of 18-64 population) and the lagged amount of incentives to startups in the estimation model for the number of potential entrepreneurs over adult population. To sum up, our second (dynamic) 2SLS model with FE can be written as follows:
where vectors x E it , x K it denote the same set of control variables as in equations (13), (14) (notice that the vector x E i,t now also includes the 1-year lagged amount of incentives to startups).
Our second IV procedure is the pooled three-stage least squares (3SLS) over the dynamic 2SLS model (15) . This technique has the advantage of incorporating information from the cross-correlations of the error terms in the equations (13), (14) . The 3SLS estimator is consistent and, in general, asymptotically more efficient than the 2SLS estimator. If the disturbances in the different structural equations are uncorrelated, so that the contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix of the disturbances of the structural equations is diagonal, 3SLS reduces to 2SLS.
As a third approach, we finally perform an Arellano-Bover estimation. Since lags of the dependent variables are necessarily correlated with the idiosyncratic errors ((l E ) i,t−1 with ε i,s and (l K ) i,t−1 with η i,s , for s < t), traditional static panel data model estimators of the dynamic equations in (15) are not consistent in panels with a short time dimension (Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 11). We tackle this problem by using the methodology proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) over the two equations of (15) . The Arellano-Bover estimator, which employs an instrumental variable technique on the orthogonal deviations model (an alternative to first-differencing proposed by Arellano and Bond, 1991) by using appropriate lags of the dependent variables as instruments, leads to consistent parameter estimates. The orthogonal deviations transformation of the variables in equations (15) We are now ready to comment the results of our empirical analysis.
Findings
Our findings, summarized in Table 3 , confirm the theoretical prediction contained in 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
According to the FE estimates (columns 1-2), a one percentage point increase in the ratio between venture capital funds and GDP is associated with 1.762 percentage points increase in the share of innovative entrepreneurs over working age population (α K = 1.762). At the same time, a one percentage point increase in the share of innovative entrepreneurs over working age population is associated with 0.042 percentage points increase in the ratio between venture capital funds and GDP (β E = 0.042).
Among the other determinants of the share of innovative entrepreneurs (column 1), only the share of startup incentives (over GDP) and the share of non-innovative early stage entrepreneurs (over 18-64 population) are found to be significant (and positive). Conversely, among the remaining determinants of the VC funds size (column 2), the amount of VC funds is found to be negatively affected by the prevalence of the traditional bank credit lending models and by the number of patent applications. 22 Moving to the estimates of the first 2SLS model (columns 3-4), the coefficients of the two endogenous variables slightly decrease: in particular, α K becomes equal to 1.375 while β E to 0.040. The estimated coefficients of the remaining regressors are very close to their pure FE results. Our goodness-of-fit measures indicate that the model fits the data well. In particular, the F statistics for joint significance of the instruments in first-stage regressions reject the null hypotheses of weak instruments, since they are higher than the first-stage F value provided by the Staiger-Stock (1997) rule of thumb (F = 10). Our underidentification tests -based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistics for estimates with heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors-reject the null hypothesis that the equations are underidentified (that is, the matrix of reduced form coefficients on the excluded instruments are full column rank); the Hansen statistics do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments (that is, that they are uncorrelated with the error term), and hence the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equations.
The dynamic 2SLS model performs even better (columns 5-6). The p-values of our overidentification tests improve as well as the weak identification and underidentification test statistics. Compared to the first 2SLS model, the estimated complementarities between the size of venture capital funds and the share of innovative entrepreneurs slightly decrease in magnitude, α K moving to 1.172 and β E to 0.036. Moreover, both endogenous variables turn to be significantly and positively autocorrelated. In the equation for the share of innovative entrepreneurs, notice that (i) the amount of incentives to startups becomes significant only in its lagged form; (ii) the coefficient of number of scientific articles (per 100 scientific graduates) becomes significantly negative; 23 (iii) 22 The reader might wonder why patents have a consistently negative effect on the size of VC funds.
We conjecture the following explanation. On the one hand, more patents imply more new ideas around in search of financial funds, and thus foster the raising of new VC funds. On the other hand, it is well known that patents (and IPRs more generally) may also harm the innovation process, as innovative firms engage in ever more costly patent wars. Given that the first positive effect is already captured by our main variable "innovative early stage entrepreneurs", we conjecture that this negative coefficient might be capturing the "dark side" of patents. 23 This negative relation may be due to the particular quantitative measure of scientific articles (per 100 scientific graduates) that we use here, which counts the number of articles from journals classified by the Institute for Scientific Information's Science Citation Index (SCI) and Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) and thus reflect a significant bias toward English-language journals (The World the ratio between bank and financial credit becomes significantly positive. In the equation for the size of VC funds instead, notice that the credit bureau coverage becomes significantly positive, while the GDP growth and the trend variable become significantly negative (the last variable indicating a negative impact of the recent financial crisis with the amount of VC funds declining by around 0.02 percentage points year after year). When estimating the system (15) by 3SLS (columns 7-8), the estimated coefficients are very close to those obtained from the dynamic 2SLS model. Again, our diagnostic testing procedures suggest that our estimates are statistically valid: (i) the F statistics for joint significance of the instruments in first-stage regressions reject the null hypotheses of weak instruments, (ii) our underidentification tests reject the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified, (iii) the Hansen statistics do not reject null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments. Finally, the Arellano-Bover estimation results (columns 9-10) -which are consistent to possible correlation between the error term and any lag of the dependent variable -also confirm our theoretical predictions. We find that one percentage point increase in the share of venture capital funds over GDP induces 1.250 percentage points increase in the share of innovative entrepreneurs over working age population, and a one percentage point increase in the share of innovative entrepreneurs over working age population induces 0.027 percentage points increase in the share of venture capital funds over GDP. Compared to the previous IV-style estimates, among the determinants of the share of innovative entrepreneurs, the ratio between bank and financial credit turns insignificant; among the determinants of the size of VC funds, the degree of market capitalization and the interest rate are found to positively affect the venture capital market development, while the coefficient for the number of patent applications becomes insignificant. For the Arellano-Bover estimator to be consistent, the errors need to be serially uncorrelated. This is indeed the case. According to the ArellanoBover test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors, the null hypothesis of serial uncorrelation is rejected at order 1 but not at higher orders, thus implying that lag order 2 (or higher) variables are valid instruments. Finally, the null hypothesis that the population moment conditions are correct is not rejected by the Hansen test.
Bank databank metadata). Hence, the measure is likely to be overestimated for Anglosaxon countries (US and UK) and underestimated for countries with a still relatively high percentage of innovative entrepreneurs over adult population (such as Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Switzerland).
The Multiplier Effect in the Venture Capital Market
Using the coefficients reported in the previous subsection, we can easily produce a quantitative measure of the multiplier. This number is useful to gain a rough idea of the "additional" volatility generated by the thick market externality documented above. More formally, solving the linear system composed of (13) and (14) by the two endogenous variables l e ,l k , we find the usual expression for the multiplier as
Plugging the results from our estimates of α K and β E into this formula, we obtain a value of m between 1.03 and 1.08 (see the last row of Table 3 ). These numbers tell us that a shock to either side of the market -such as an increase in start-up incentives for entrepreneurs, or an improvement in the credit information transparency for the capitalists -produces an impact on the equilibrium values of innovative entrepreneurs and of VC funds which is between 3% and 8% higher than it would have produced in the absence of strategic complementarity. Although not exhaustive, this argument may contribute to explain the pronounced volatility that we observe in the market for entrepreneurial finance.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has built a model of the market for innovation that focuses on the relationship between innovators and financiers. An innovation is the outcome of a search and matching process between an innovator with a new project and a financier backing that project. The model has investigated the choice of innovators and financiers as to whether or not to participate in a fair of innovation and has determined the equilibrium number of innovators and financiers contributing to the innovation process along the steady state. The main purpose of the modeling strategy that we have followed has been the one of representing the venture capital cycle described in the literature on entrepreneurial finance (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) . 24 The one discussed here is a particular case of that considered in Proposition 2 for two reasons.
First, that model is generally non-linear. Secondly, there the shock can, more generally, hit both sides of the market at the same time (in fact, the expression for the multiplier contained in (17) in the Proof of Proposition 2 collapses to (16) if ∂f K /∂ρ = 0, that is, if the shock hits only one side of the market).
We have shown that a strategic complementarity exists between innovators and financiers, in that an increase in participation of the former induces an increase in participation of the latter (and viceversa). This complementarity is at the root of a multiplier effect in the process of financing innovation, which magnifies the effects of any exogenous shock on the innovative performance of the system. The second part of the paper has been devoted to the empirical validation of the main theoretical result of the model. Our findings confirm the existence of a significant complementarity between the demand and the supply side of the venture capital market and thus signal the presence of a thick market externality. Our estimation has also allowed us to obtain a quantitative measure of the multiplier effect in this market which can, at least in part, rationalize the volatility documented in the Introduction.
Let us close the paper hinting at a different line of interpretation of our findings.
A salient and well known empirical characteristic of the process of entrepreneurial innovation is its high degree of geographic clusterization. Pursuing further this line of reasoning and comparing it with alternative, and more consolidated, explanations to the formation of entrepreneurial clusters (as in Guiso and Schivardi, 2011) transcend the scope of this paper but might be an interesting future research avenue.
[ 
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. The entrepreneurs' reaction function with respect to capitalists, f E (L K ), is implicitly defined by the steady state condition
which is strictly positive given that dc * E /dα E > 0, and that
which is strictly negative given that dc * E /dα E > 0 and that
Hence, by the implicit function theorem, we have
To prove that df K /dL E > 0, a totally symmetric argument can be developed starting from the total differentiation of (12) with respect to L E .
Proof of Theorem 2. Define L j = f j (L −j , ρ) as the reaction function of L j to L −j , for j = E, K and where ρ captures all the model's parameters. By convention, suppose that ∂f j /∂ρ > 0. Then it is
On the other hand,
Substituting the second expression into the first, we obtain
given that ∂f K /∂ρ > 0 and that -as ensured in Theorem 1-∂f j /∂L −j > 0 for j = E, K.
B Data
The number of potential innovative entrepreneurs. This data is obtained from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data base. In particular, the GEM ques- The size of the potential financing market. As already recalled in the main text, the first challenge encountered in the definition of this variable is that we do not have data on total managed funds prior to 2013 for most European countries. However, we do have data on the inflows and the outflows (divestments and fundrasing activity) The second challenge is that these "total managed funds" include funds of both venture capital and private equity firms, while we are interested in the funds managed 
